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In summary

On 7 October 2026, the High Court handed down its first judgment relating to climate change in MACH Energy v DAMSHEG [2026] HCA 35. In a 3:2 decision, the Court rejected the Mt Pleasant coal mine operator’s appeal from a 2025 ruling from the NSW Court of Appeal that set aside the Independent Planning Commission’s (IPC) approval of a proposed expansion.

While the decision turns on the specific facts of the case and statutory construction of NSW legislation and the State Environmental Planning Policy, the Court’s reasoning on climate issues, particularly causation, will have wider application to other climate disputes.

The Court found the IPC was obliged to consider whether to approve the expansion subject to conditions to ensure that all greenhouse gas emissions, including scope 3 emissions, are minimised to the greatest extent practicable. The IPC imposed conditions in relation to abating scope 1 and 2 emissions but did not consider imposing conditions in relation to scope 3 emissions.

Grounds of Appeal

The three grounds dealt with by the appeal were:

Whether the IPC failed to take into consideration the “likely impacts of that development, including environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality” in accordance with s 4.15(1)(b) of Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPA Act).

Whether the NSWCA was correct to hold the Commission took into consideration cl 2.20(1)(c) of the State Environmental Planning Policy (Resources and Energy) 2021 (NSW) (the Resources SEPP) as required by s 4.15(1)(a)(i) of EPA Act, and whether or not the consent should be issued subject to conditions aimed at ensuring that greenhouse gas emissions are minimised to the greatest extent possible.

Whether the impact of climate change is capable of being an environmental impact in the locality of the development within the meaning of s 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act.

Failure to consider the Resources SEPP

In considering ground 2, the majority of the High Court (Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ) found that the IPC decision was affected by a jurisdictional error, but for different reasons to NSW Court of Appeal.

In summary, it held the error was because the IPC failed to consider a provision of an applicable environmental planning instrument, namely cl 2.20(1) of the Resources SEPP. According to the Court, the IPC was obliged to consider whether to grant consent subject to conditions to ensure that all greenhouse gas emissions, including scope 3 emissions, are minimised ‘to the greatest extent practicable’. Beech-Jones J described this as follows:

there is no express reference in the Commission's reasons to the Commission having considered whether consent to the development should be issued subject to any conditions concerning scope 3 GHG emissions, much less to conditions to ensure that scope 3 GHG emissions are minimised to the greatest extent practicable.⁽¹⁾

Gordon J (with whom Edelman J and Beech-Jones J agreed) found the IPC consideration of scope 3 emissions was limited to an analysis of whether they were “appropriately regulated and accounted for through broader national policies and international agreements (such as the Paris Agreement)”.⁽²⁾ Her Honour found:

There is no reference to emissions “scopes” in the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, or any other international law at the treaty or customary level. The impact of greenhouse gas emissions is the same regardless of how they are categorised.⁽³⁾

In reaching this conclusion, Gordon J referenced both the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change⁽⁴⁾ and the corresponding Request submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law.⁽⁵⁾ This is significant, as environmental and planning decision makers have historically relied on reasoning similar to that found by the IPC in this case: that the Paris Agreement does not require them to consider the regulation of scope 3 emissions.

Edelman J adopted similar reasoning, describing the IPC as being ‘distracted’ by scopes:

Finally, as explained later in these reasons, the Commission's reasons reveal that the Commission was acutely conscious of the impacts of climate change both generally and in the locality. With all of those impacts as detailed by the Commission, it would be extremely curious for the Commission to have focused only upon conditions concerning two per cent of the emissions and not even to have mentioned the possibility of any conditions to minimise 98 per cent of the emissions. In this context, the obvious interpretation of the Commission's reasons is that the Commission treated it as unnecessary to consider scope 3 emissions because they would be counted in the emissions of the countries to which the coal was exported for consumption. The natural and irresistible interpretation of the Commission's reasons is that the Commission was distracted by the accounting concepts of the scopes into which greenhouse gas emissions are divided.⁽⁶⁾

The Court also rejected the arguments of the NSW Court of Appeal that the forensic decision of DAMSHEG not to suggest conditions to mitigate adverse environmental effects did not lead to invalidity, noting the statutory scheme placed the responsibility on MACH Energy as the proponent to do so.⁽⁷⁾

The majority Judges frequently referred to the extent of the scope 3 emissions from the project in their judgments.⁽⁸⁾ For example Gordon J stated:

In circumstances where Scope 3 emissions made up the vast majority (98 per cent) of the Project's total emissions and not only were identified but were within the "assessment boundary" for the Project, the Commission cannot be said to have discharged this obligation by considering only whether to impose conditions that minimised to the greatest extent practicable Scope 1 and 2 emissions – the remaining two per cent of the Project's emissions.⁽⁹⁾

Likely impacts of the development on the environment

On the first ground, the Court disagreed with the NSW Court of Appeal on the construction of s 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act. While the section requires the decision maker to consider the “likely impacts of that development including environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality”, unlike the findings of the NSW Court of Appeal, it did not require the consideration of those impacts in the locality. This was because of the positioning of the comma in the section, as consideration of the locality were only required in relation to “social and economic impacts”. It was sufficient to discharge this obligation for the IPC to note that the project would contribute to anthropogenic climate change and the cumulative impacts would be felt globally⁽¹⁰⁾.

Causation

The Court did not weigh in on the contentious issue of climate causation. In its appeal, MACH Energy submitted that it was not possible to link the Mt Pleasant mine expansion to climate impacts in the locality because they amounted to 0.0065% of global annual emissions. The Union of Concerned Scientists intervened in the appeal to argue that scientific evidence could have been raised to rebut these claims.⁽¹¹⁾

As its earlier grounds were unsuccessful, the Court found it was unnecessary to determine the causation issue. It did, however, note it was troubled by the argument being raised only on appeal. Edelman J referred to the fact that MACH Energy denied they were relying on a “but for” causal test, while arguing DAMSHEG were required to show “any one source of emissions may be causative of climate change impacts in a particular locality”.⁽¹²⁾ As both Gordon and Edelman JJ noted, there were considerable difficulties in raising these arguments in an appellate Court because scientific evidence around source and event attribution could have been given on this point.⁽¹³⁾

Importantly, Edelman J commented that it would be necessary to consider any non-trivial greenhouse gas contribution where those gases have impacts on climate change in the natural and built environments generally, or upon the natural and built environments in the specific locality of the project.⁽¹⁴⁾ This is an important finding as it will mean that decision makers will arguably need to do more than assert “likely impacts” are trivial or what is often coined “drop in the ocean” arguments, as has been argued in the past by decision-makers under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).

Conclusion

The High Court decision is only the start of the continued development of jurisprudence in Australia on climate change. It is likely that many of the obiter comments of the Court are the subject of continued debate in future litigation, particularly as climate damages grow.


⁽¹⁾ At [291].
⁽²⁾ MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd v Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc & Ors [2026] HCA 35, [182].
⁽³⁾ Ibid.
⁽⁴⁾ International Court of Justice, 23 July 2025.
⁽⁵⁾ Case No 31, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 21 May 2024.
⁽⁶⁾ MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd v Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc & Ors [2026] HCA 35, [238–239].
⁽⁷⁾ At [196].
⁽⁸⁾ See [208–209], [214], [230] (Edelman J); [77] (Gordon J); [309] (Beech-Jones J).
⁽⁹⁾ At [178].
⁽¹⁰⁾ At [159].
⁽¹¹⁾ At [205].
⁽¹²⁾ At [214].
⁽¹³⁾ At [214] and [205].
⁽¹⁴⁾ At [217].

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The contents of this blog post are considered accurate as at the date of publication. However the applicable laws may be subject to change, thereby affecting the accuracy of the article. The information contained in this blog post is of a general nature only and is not specific to anyone’s personal circumstances. Please seek legal advice before acting on any of the information contained in this post.

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